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Abstract
We consider a duopoly industry with two separate firms each selling an indivisible prod-
uct. The joint consumption of these goods has a specific value for the consumers which
exceeds the mere addition of utilities when products are consumed in isolation : the higher
this excess, the larger the complementarity between the goods. We analyse price equilibria in
this market as related to the degree of complementarity existing between the two products.
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1. Consider a market with two separate firms each offering an indivisible good. Each
good can be consumed separately but joint consumption is also an available alternative for the
consumer. Furthermore, we assume that products are complements, in the sense that joint
consumption yields a larger utility than the mere addition of utilities obtained when products
are consumed in isolation. On the other hand, it is as well meaningful to consume one of them
at the exclusion the other.
As an example, consider the following situation. When buying a new dress, a woman can
be thought of as deriving utility from the comfort obtained from wearing the dress. Should
we therefore expect a woman to buy only a single dress among the existing ones, possibly the
most comfortable one, and wear it out? This possibility could make sense to an economist but
certainly not to a ”real- life” woman. Should she buy two identical dresses, and wear them
alternatively? Again this is a possibility, a bit more sensible. It is intuitive however that there
is something to be gained when buying two different dresses: namely the possibility of choosing
between the two dresses and, eventually, combining each of them with different shoes and clothes.
In this example, we see distinct goods whose isolated consumption is an available option, but
whose joint purchase defines a third good, choosing among the two dresses, in addition to simply
wearing them, which may be valuable per se. Therefore the utility accruing from the purchase
of the two goods is higher than the mere ”addition” of the utilities obtained from their separate
consumption.
Another example is as follows.1 Consider an advertising agency wishing to buy ad-spots to
be inserted in newspapers. Buying one spot in a wide-audience newspaper is an option, as well
as buying one in a more specialized journal. However, buying spots in both newspapers may
also be highly valuable, even if their audiences overlap. In particular, if advertising efficiency is
correlated with the repetition of the messages, the benefit of simultaneously placing two ad-spots
may exceed the sum of the benefits which would obtain under each separate option.
These two examples share a common feature: joint consumption has a specific value, which
is larger than the mere addition of that of separate purchases, but the purchase of one good at
the exclusion of the other is also a non-trivial alternative.
1This example is drawn from Gabszewicz, Laussel and Sonnac (1999)
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The early contribution of Cournot (1838) already pointed out that, in cases where only joint
consumption makes sense, firms set an identical price based only on the value of the joint con-
sumption. The recent literature on competition among complementary components of composite
goods (see Matutes and Regibeau (1989), Economides and Salop (1992)) is also related to our
context. The main difference with ours is that separate consumption of individual components is
nil while that of the composite good is significant. Each firm is accordingly assumed to produce
all components, while we assume that each good is produced by a separate firm. The key issue
studied in this literature is whether firms should sell separate, fully compatible components or
supply the market with a composite good whose components are incompatible with those of the
rival firms.
Because, in our model, each product can be consumed at the exclusion of the other, each
firm faces a trade-off when choosing its price: either it behaves as a pure monopolist, neglecting
the presence of the complementary good, or it designs its pricing strategy taking into account
consumers’ valuation for joint consumption. Intuition suggests that, because joint consumption
is valued beyond mere addition, the firm can charge a higher price if it sells only to those who
consume both products. As a counterpart, the firm’s sales depend on the total price of the
bundle, i.e. on the other’s price as well. Clearly, the issue of the trade-off will depend on
the relative valuation of separate consumption, as compared with that of the ”joint” product,
i.e. on the degree of product complementarity. In the proposition below, we show that when
the complementarity is weak, only asymetric equilibria exist at which one firm behaves as a
pure monopolist while the other benefits from the complementarity of the two goods. In this
case, there are consumers who buy only the monopoly product and others who buy both. When
complementarity is strong, a unique symmetric equilibrium prevails where both firms coordinate
on the value of the bundle. All consumers then buy simultaneously the two products: This is
the Cournot result referred to above. For intermediate values, both types of equilibria coexist.
In order to establish our results we rely on a standard modelling tool for analyzing markets
with vertically differentiated products, based on the preferences ”a` la Mussa-Rosen”. The only
difference is that we now allow the consumers to buy simultaneously the two products while it
is generally assumed that consumers make mutually exclusive purchases. As it will soon appear,
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this is sufficient to dramatically alter the nature of price competition.
2. Consider a model with two products indexed by their quality ui, i = 1, 2. Without loss of
generality, we assume that u2 ≥ u1. Firms sell at zero cost. They choose prices non-cooperatively
in order to maximize profits.
Consumers are indexed by a parameter θ, which expresses the intensity of their preferences
for buying a unit of the good. The utility derived by consumer θ when buying one unit of good
i is given by
uiθ − pi, (1)
where pi denotes the price of good i. When buying the two goods simultaneously, a consumer
can be viewed as consuming a new good of quality u3. Our key assumption in the following is
that
u3 ≥ u1 + u2.
We suppose that consumer θ, if he buys, buys either one unit of a good, or one unit of the
”bundle”.2 In what follows, the difference between u3 and u1 + u2 will be used as a proxy for
the degree of complementarity.3
The problem of a consumer therefore summarizes as
Max{0, u1θ − p1, u2θ − p2, u3θ − (p1 + p2)}. (2)
Let us denote by θi the consumer who is indifferent between buying good i or not buying.
Using (2) we obtain:
θ1 =
p1
u1
, θ2 =
p2
u2
, θ3 =
p1 + p2
u3
(3)
Demand addressed to each firm is then easily derived. By definition, the set of consumers
willing to buy product i, given pi, is defined by the interval [θi, 1]. It may be the case however
that among these consumers who are willing to buy i, some are also willing to buy j, in which
case they buy both because u3 ≥ u1 + u2. Consider for instance p2 such that θ2 < 1, i.e. some
2Notice that we do not allow for the purchase of two units of an identical product. This assumption reflects
the idea that what is specifically valued when two products are bought is precisely that they are different.
3In the extreme case where u3 = u1 + u2, products can even be viewed as independent. Caillaud,Grilo and
Thisse (1999) consider a case where u3 < u1 + u2.
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consumers are willing to buy product 2. The demand addressed to firm 1 is constructed as
follows. When setting a large p1, firm 1 first sells its product to those consumers with high
θ, i.e. those consumers who exhibit a strong taste for the good. They are also those who are
willing to buy product 2. Accordingly, firm 1’s sales are defined by those consumers who buy
the bundle. Demand is thus defined by θ3. Eventually, for sufficiently low prices, firm 1 will sell
not only to those interested in buying the bundle but also to some consumers who are willing
to buy product 1 only, given p2. This will happen whenever θ1 < θ3. Demand addressed to firm
i is therefore defined either by 1− θ3 or by 1− θi. The latter definition holds whenever θi < θ3.
Formally we obtain:
D1(p1, p2) =


1− p1u1 if p1 ≤ p2 u1u3−u1
1− p1+p2u3 if p1 ≥ p2 u1u3−u1
(4)
D2(p1, p2) =


1− p2u2 if p2 ≤ p1 u2u3−u2
1− p1+p2u3 if p2 ≥ p1 u2u3−u2
(5)
Notice that these demands are kinked but not concave. Accordingly payoffs might not be
concave in own price. In order to characterize the set of Nash equilibria of the pricing game, we
first identify three critical regions in the space of prices, according to their resulting demands.
This is done in Figure 1.
In region A, demand addressed to firm 1 is given by 1 − p1+p2u3 whereas firm 2’s demand
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is given by 1 − p2u2 , i.e. in region A firm 1 sells only to consumers buying the two products
whereas firm 2 enjoys in addition ”exclusive” buyers. Formally, firm 2’s demand is that of a
pure monopolist. In region C, the contrary prevails and, in region B, both firms’ sales are defined
by the demand for the bundle. Two remarks are in order here. First, whenever u3 tends to
u1 + u2 region B shrinks and eventually disappears for the case where u3 = u1 + u2, i.e. when
buying the two products has no value per se. Alternatively, should isolated consumptions yield
negligible utilities, only region B would be relevant. Second, in region A and C, one of the firm’s
payoffs does not depend on the rival’s price.
Let us now derive best replies. Due to the fact that payoffs are not quasiconcave, best replies
exhibit discontinuties which reflect the two possible strategy profiles available to the firms: either
it plays ”on the value” of the bundle with high prices or it acts as a monopolist over a larger
market with lower prices. We identify the first case as the ”complementarity regime” and the
other as the ”monopoly regime”.
Consider firm 1. Playing on the complementarity of the products yields a payoff equal to
p1(1− p1+p2u3 ). This payoff is valid only in regions A,B. Using the first order necessary condition
we identify the candidate best reply b1(p2) = u3−p22 . It yields a payoffs π
c
1(p2) =
(u3−p2)2
4u3
.
Playing as a monopolist amounts to quote pM1 =
u1
2 , yielding a payoff π
M
1 =
u21
4 . This payoff
is valid only in region C. In order to identify the ”true” best reply of firm 1, it remains to
compare the payoffs in these two cases. Solving πc1(p2) = π
M
1 we identify a critical price for
firm 2, denoted pˆ2, at which firm 1 switches from the complementarity regime to the monopoly
regime. A similar argument applies for firm 2. We may therefore summarize firms’ best replies
φi as follows
φi(pi, pj) =


ui
2 if pj ≥ pˆj =
√
u3(
√
u3 −√ui)
bi(pj) =
u3−pj
2 if pj ≤ pˆj =
√
u3(
√
u3 −√ui)
(6)
In order to identify the set of price equilibria, notice first that for firm 1 to be on the first
branch of its best reply, it must be that the pair of prices is in region C on figure 1. At the same
time, firm 2’s best reply in region C is defined by the second branch of (6). There exists therefore
an asymmetric Nash equilibrium candidate with firm 1 playing ”monopoly” and firm 2 playing
”complementarity”; it is given by (pM1 , b2(p
M
1 )) = (
u1
2 ,
2u3−u1
4 ). Obviously there exists a similar
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asymmetric candidate where firm 2 plays ”monopoly” in region A, namely (2u3−u24 ,
u2
2 ). Finally,
there is a symmetric Nash candidate equilibrium with both firms playing ”complementarity”, in
region B, which is (p∗1, p∗2) = (
u3
3 ,
u3
3 ). It is then a matter of computation to identify under which
parametric constellations each of these candidates is indeed an equilibrium. As summarized in
Proposition 1, one, two or three equilibria may coexist.
Proposition 1 When goods are weakly complementary (u3 ∈ [u1 + u2, 94u2]), only asymmetric
”monopoly” equilibria exist. When goods are strongly complementary (u3 ≥ (32 +
√
2)u2), the
unique equilibrium is the symmetric ”complementarity” one. For intermediate complementarity,
the two types of equilibria coexist.
Figure 2 illustrates our Proposition. A formal proof of it can be found in the appendix.
3. As stated above, it is known since Cournot (1838) that when two distinct goods are
useful only as components of a third one, firms set a unique price, reflecting only the value of
the composite good, irrespective of the specific contribution of each good to this value. This
conclusion also holds in our setting when goods are strongly complementary: even though
products do not contribute in the same proportion to the value of the bundle, firms quote
identical prices at equilibrium. At the other extreme, when the value of joint consumption
is simply defined as the sum of the separate consumption values, there is nothing specifically
valuable in consuming the bundle. In this case, firms strategies are fully independent and each
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sets its monopoly price defined with reference to its own value ui. This occurs when u1+u2 = u3.
Our analysis has focused on all the cases of intermediate complementarity that lie between these
two extremes. Its outcome may then be summarized as follows. Because the bundle exhibits a
specific value, it may be profitable for the firm to design its strategy on the value of the bundle.
However, because this strategy implies using a higher price, it has a cost: that of reducing
market share by loosing that part of the market which is willing to consume only one of the
two products (low θ’s). When complementarity is high, this dilemma is easily solved because
the value of the bundle is significantly higher so that the price effect dominates the market sales
effect. For intermediate complementarity, the dilemma cannot be solved so easily. The surplus
obtained from joint consumption is not large enough to be shared between the two firms, so that
asymmetric equilibria arise at which only one firm appropriates the value attached to the bundle
leaving no other choice to the other but to maximize its monopoly profit. There is a coordination
problem here because each firm would like to benefit from the externality that arises from the
existence of the complementary product. On the contrary, when the externality is large, one
firm cannot expect the other to let him capture alone the full benefit of the complementarity.
As a consequence, only the symmetric equilibrium survives.
It is straightforward to show that whenever they coexist (intermediate complementarity), the
aggregate profits under asymmetric equilibria dominate aggregate profits at the symmetric one.
Therefore, although the symmetric equilibrium may seem collusive because firms coordinate
their decisions on the value of the bundle, the symmetric equilibrium does not maximize joint
profits. Notice also that the asymmetric equilibria look like Stackelberg equilibria. Think for
instance of a time sequence where good 1 is introduced first in the market, firm 1 enjoying
accordingly a monopoly position. Then a second, complementary product is introduced by firm
2. A typical prediction of proposition 1 is the following: if complementarity is not too high,
the second mover is likely to take full advantage of the complementarity, irrespective of the
value of its good when considered in isolation. This is exactly what happens at the asymmetric
equilibria.
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A Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1
There are three candidate Nash equilibria, which we identify according to the region in which
they are defined.
• candidate A: pA1 = u3−p
M
2
2 =
2u3−u2
4 , p
M
2 =
u2
2
• candidate B: p∗1 = p∗2 = u33
• candidate C: pM1 = u12 , pC2 =
u3−pM1
2 =
2u3−u1
4
A necessary and sufficient condition for candidate A to be a Nash equilibrium is that pA1 ≥ pˆ1.
Computations indicate that this is satisfied whenever u3 ∈ [u1 + u2, (32 +
√
2)u2].
A necessary and sufficient condition for candidate C is that pA2 ≥ pˆ2. Computations indicate
that this is satisfied whenever u3 ∈ [u1 + u2, (32 +
√
2)u1]
A necessary and sufficient condition for candidate B is that p∗i ≤Min{pˆ1, pˆ2}. Since u1 ≤ u2,
Min{pˆ1, pˆ2} = pˆ2. Computations indicate that candidate B is a Nash equilibrium whenever
u3 ≥ 94u2.
Taking into account our assumptions u1 ≤ u2 and u3 ≥ u1 + u2, we can identify four critical
regions as a function of u3.
1. Whenever u3 ∈ [u1 + u2, 94u3[, only candidate A and C are Nash equilibria.
2. Whenever u3 ∈ [94u3, (32 +
√
2)u1[, candidate A,B and C are Nash equilibria
3. Whenever u3 ∈ [(32 +
√
2)u1, (32 +
√
2)u2[, candidate A and B are Nash equilibria
4. Whenever u3 ≥ (32 +
√
2)u2,the unique Nash equilibrium is candidate B.
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